In 2012, Laurence D. Cooper published his essay, Every Man a Socrates? Tocqueville and the Conceit of Modernity. It receives its title from a special connection that Cooper draws between the opinion of french sociologist Alexis de Tocqueville and two different types of Socratism, which may be understood in the broadest sense as two different mindsets.
Tocqueville's opinion is that of American democracy, but for the sake of my Canadian readers and the purpose of this article, I will assume a similar democratic mentality to occupy both America and Canada. I shall further refer to Tocqueville's specific interest in Americans instead as a general finding of North-Americans.
I am also aware of how focused this article is on what might appear as western ideals being applied solely to North-America, but if you continue reading you will find that an evaluation of "the west" is being given so that some solutions to this specific western society's most feeble problems may be seriously considered. Besides, perhaps Natalie Wynn from ContraPoints is correct to suggest that the concept of the west be eradicated altogether, and perhaps I will insert a satisfying degree of critique of some seemingly explicitly western practices (a.k.a. democracy and its ill effects) - enough to get the point across to my readers regardless of where they are from.
Now, to the point.
The two types of Socratism that Cooper introduces in his essay in order to improve our understanding of the concerns that Tocqueville expresses in Democracy in America are popular and original Socratism:
Popular Socratism is a term coined by Cooper to help explain Tocqueville’s impression of the North-American democratic mind. Despite Tocqueville's impression being published in 1835, it continues to bare relevance.
It embraces intellectual independence, a commitment to knowing only what is useful to know, and the vindication of self-interest. These principles are taken ironically and somewhat perversely from the narrated characteristics of the legendary Greek philosopher Socrates, but they help better one’s understanding of original Socratism by essentially reversing their nature. Basically, popular Socratism is a version of original Socratism that Socrates himself would probably compare to the likes of sophistry.
Original Socratism on the other hand, is the intellectual independence from anything but reason and truth. It is a commitment to all knowledge, because all knowledge is useful for its own sake. It also embraces the interest of a self that can only be found through collective discussion.
Cooper claims that Tocqueville “reads almost as a blueprint of popular Socratism centuries before it gained ascendancy." This is not to say that Tocqueville was a popular Socratist, but that he recognized early on the ways in which North-Americans are prone to adopting its principles. Cooper also claims that original Socratism has yet to be successfully introduced to the democratic people.
This is an an unfortunate thought.
Nevertheless, before considering how such an introduction might ever be possible, it is important to identify the multiple views toward the negative effects of democracy that Tocqueville and Socrates share. Their analogous pessimism toward democracy proves that the three general principles of popular Socratism collectively discourage unoriginal Socratism from entering North-American society.
Their views also corroborate the proposition that for original Socratism to be welcomed into modern democratic life, it must be introduced in a way that does not insult the average democratic mind. Luckily for us, there are numerous apps that can supposedly assist us in accomplishing this seemingly impossible task - more on this later.
The first similarity between Tocqueville and Socrates can be found with the first general principle of popular Socratism, which Tocqueville refers to as the “philosophical method” of the democratic North-American. According to Tocqueville, their cognitive method is determined by their own reason supported by public opinion. Tocqueville’s criticism is acknowledging the lack of logical inquiry found in a democratic system based on public opinion.
It is important to accept, at least in Tocqueville’s understanding, that democracy depends on the ideal of high levels of equality, and the idea that every person is equal in rights infers that no citizen can be wiser than the next. In a democracy, despite the potential intelligent superiority of one presidential candidate compared to another, it is not always legitimate coherence of their intelligence that improves their chances of winning an election. Instead, it is the likability of the candidate; as opposed to their ability to articulate the party's platform. Thus democracy assumes that because public opinion is determined equally by all citizens, and no citizen has more valuable ideas than the others, wisdom supervenes majority.
But this is simply incorrect; obviously some people are wiser or smarter than others. While it’s possible that the value of everyone's life is equal, there are some radical ideas that most North-Americans would agree should not receive equal praise or anything beyond equal consideration (i.e., slavery, circumstantial rape, etc.).
Socrates would agree. In his opinion, not everyone has the intellectual abilities to properly cultivate their wisdom, no matter the equal opportunity potentially offered at birth. This is because some people are merely born more special than others, thus naturally inclined to be leaders. Tocqueville also understands that there are certain individuals who bestow more valuable ideas to society and have a stronger influence on culture than their peers. He believes that such people would contribute far more to society if they were given a distinct education in classical literature, and more specifically, the study of ancient Greek and Latin literature.
Something interesting to consider is that although Tocqueville does not believe “the ancients” such as Plato to produce flawless work, he does believe that they possess certain qualities that can help reduce the deficiencies of popular Socratism, and that anyone may benefit from reading philosophical works if they took the time to do so. Likewise, Socrates encourages philosophical discussion. For him, it is the highest form of intellectual contribution to society, and he encourages it especially among those who share a similar destiny of Tocqueville’s account.
Consequently, one might ask how a philosophical method such as popular Socratism which lacks intellectual merit could last in such developed countries that are otherwise scientifically impressive, whether Canada or America. In Tocqueville’s view, the answer is simple, and it leads us to the second general principle of popular Socratism which is that “[North-]Americans have not needed to draw their philosophic method from books; they have found it in themselves.” This suggests a utilitarian mind-set which Cooper deems as a tendency to disregard anything “which does not serve our palpable material interest. What is unknowable to us is useless and therefore is not.” Sadly, it appears that philosophy and collective discussion have been disregarded by North-Americans in this way.
But surely Tocqueville is being a bit dramatic with his account of both today’s North-America and the North-America of his time. Even if public opinion largely represents the value of true knowledge in North-America, that does not mean that true knowledge has been completely omitted. Cooper’s claim that “self-interest and banal materialism have flourished, but so has resolute willingness to sacrifice narrow interest for the sake of high principle, at least among some” is quite agreeable. However, the fact that only “some” have adopted this willingness to sacrifice narrow interest is something worth mentioning. Some is not most, and a strong concern that Tocqueville has for North-Americans is that most of them are not willing to sacrifice their safe “general ideas” for a challenging, though more genuine truth.
As Socrates famously advocates, to acquire any bit of knowledge one must first acknowledge that they know nothing. Tocqueville suggests that this is not something most North-Americans are keen on admitting. Even if democratic principles do not suppress intellectual expression and in fact encourage people to employ this freedom, they also promote and contribute to a sort of irony that mocks the virtue of intellectual independence. This intellectual freedom, in many cases, suppresses the very potential of intellectual independence. Not everyone is blinded by this freedom, and there are many people who still use it honourably like Socrates did to seek and express the truth.
However, a democratic society where everyone’s opinion is equal in consideration almost influences people to settle and remain content with that which they already conceive to be true. On a more fervent side note, rather than demonstrating constructive skepticism, open-mindedness is often misunderstood as the immediate acceptance of anything presented as a morally correct belief.
According to Tocqueville, democracy promotes intellectual comfortability which either scares people to go beyond what they already know, or convinces them that they have no need to, because there is nothing else useful to know. In a further, more abstract comparison, because Socrates never gives a precise explanation in his discussions, many of his interlocutors assume that he is either trying to humiliate or mislead them. Often times when Socrates refutes their opinions with logic, they feel personally attacked rather than enlightened.
Much like Socrates' frustrated interlocutor, the freedom of thought shared by Tocqueville’s typical North-American gives them the option to at least try and gain clearer comprehension into whatever topic is being discussed. Yet, like Socrates’ interlocutor, Tocqueville’s typical North-American does not like being challenged. They are similar to a sophist who prefers the appearance of intellectual achievement rather than using their intellectual abilities to find the truth in its purest form. They are a type of materialist, and the way that Socrates feels about the sophist is identical to Tocqueville’s feelings towards the materialist; he is “disgusted at their arrogance.”
According to Tocqueville, the materialist is not rare in North-American society, because in addition to the concepts of equality and freedom, North-America also has an unhealthy obsession with material gain. Tocqueville’s concern for materialism echoes Socrates’ in relation to the third general principle of popular Socratism, which is that democracy promotes self-interest in the most superficial way.
In Tocqueville’s view, meaningless external pleasures are constantly sought by North-Americans, only to be enjoyed for a small amount of time and then quickly discarded for new temporary pleasures. Cooper theorizes that Tocqueville’s criticism of materialism and it’s encouragement of ad hockery is an effort to make us aware of “the nonmaterial dimension of our being and our participation in an eternal order [which] could be described as an effort to moderate popular Socratism."
This requires some further interpretation. Similar to Socrates, Tocqueville recognizes how easily people are drawn to possessing more than what is physically necessary. For both thinkers, materialists lack the eternal motivation to appreciate why immaterial things are more important than material things. In Republic, Socrates presents his idea of the just city, which is one that does not thrive on material luxury. To this, one of Socrates’ interlocutors becomes insulted by the city’s lack of lavish foods and furniture, suggesting that these things internally improve the city and therefore the individual living in it. This reaction reflects the materialistic attitudes of the typical democratic North-American citizen described by Tocqueville, whose system also gives them a false sense of modest material desert.
It seems that materialism overshadows the greater importance of immaterial things in life, such as the fact that all physical life eventually ends, and the material things attached to it will eventually cease to matter. What does matter then, according to both thinkers, is the soul, or at least the notion of it.
The significance of the soul can be found in Tocqueville’s work when he mentions that Socrates believes the soul to be immaterial and the body unconnected to the soul after death. Cooper states that Socrates’ belief in the soul “directly challenges modern democracy’s endemic tendency toward materialism.” He believes that Tocqueville mentions Socrates and platonic philosophy in order to highlight that Plato and his favourite philosopher ultimately “achieved sublimity and are remembered to this day because they subscribed to a kind of spirituality that their long-forgotten opponents rejected."
Basically, original Socratism would be nothing without the motivation of some sort of spirituality, which, in Socrates’ case, is the reality of the soul. Although Tocqueville only mentions Socrates once in this work, Cooper suggests that it confirms the pivotal difference between original Socratism and popular Socratism, which stems from a lack of wonder and an excessive love for material things. It is what Cooper calls “the forgetting of eternity”.
Looking to Socrates for an explanation, the forgetting of eternity is the result of our failure to accept our own mortality, and the only way this can be fixed is through philosophy - which he refers to as “learning how to die." Cooper informs us that for this idea (or any idea for that matter) to be accepted into a society, it cannot threaten the passions of its citizens.
Unfortunately, as we previously established, North-America’s strongest passion is not the incontrovertible truth of mortality; it is vanity. This indicates that the main reason North-Americans do not accept original Socratism is because it has not been introduced in a way that caters to their passions the same way that the forgetting of eternity does.
Even religious people who express some desire to understand eternity will not care to acknowledge its heterogeneity. As Cooper explains, this indifference threatens both individual pride and thought: “When everything and everyone is seen as one, in Tocqueville’s view, everything and everyone – every individual – ceases to command respect." Additionally, the religious contemplation that comes with faith is possible, but for the ordinary Canadian or American citizen, it is not obligatory, thus the intellectual freedom that may follow religious contemplation is also possible but certainly not obligatory, and perhaps unlikely.
How then, shall original Socratism be introduced if it is not to belittle the North-American’s pride, or rather, the materialist’s pride? Moreover, Cooper asks if there is a more “accessible route to the acceptance of mortality, one that does not require extraordinary natural gifts” or strong religious faith.
Following his question with a surprisingly modern response, he concludes that the recent trend of “mindfulness” is North-America’s best option. It does not pressure intellectual growth, and it does not call out what its subject is lacking. Instead, it points to what can be gained by asking the subject to look within. It also points away from material distractions without actually attacking materialism.
On the contrary, one might argue that mindfulness somewhat disguises itself as a material gain. Engaging in self-care is a sign of maturity, a type of self-awareness that has become an attractive characteristic that most North-Americans are interested in proving to others that they possess. It is a habit presented most commonly on social media, and when people see others who are supposedly thriving on these habits, they see something useful and therefore desirable in adopting them themselves, turning their personal and emotional process into something that can be physically emulated.
How participating in mindfulness trends exposes the reality of mortality and the importance of its recognition depends on how deep the subject is willing to explore mindfulness-related topics. For example, if someone accumulates a strong passion for a specific type of yoga in relation to their mindfulness journey, they will be more inclined to learn about its original meditative purposes and origins, and how it relates to a number of eastern philosophies. Ideally, they will eventually be exposed to Indian philosophy, maybe taking a special interest in Buddhism, and finally obtaining a new perspective on the nature of life and death.
After all, Cooper is only suggesting a way in which original Socratism can be initially introduced to North-America, not instantaneously endorsed and understood.
From this perspective, it is indeed a good place to start.
A final link shall be made between Tocqueville and Socrates by considering, at least in theory, their similar skeptical reactions to mindfulness as a remedy for popular Socratism. Personal insight is something that Socrates affiliated solely with special philosophical understanding, but now, all that is required is a sense of motivation to better understand oneself. This might seem too good to be true for our snub-nosed friend. Similarly, Cooper thinks that Tocqueville “would have been skeptical in the face of such an offer - and worried", due to the sheer simplicity of it.
Despite the unshakable vulnerability of individuality, the effects of mindfulness must not be overlooked. As Cooper points out, it promotes an all-inclusive, light-hearted dissatisfaction with materialism and a willingness to gain new valuable perspectives on life.
What can be taken from Cooper's essay is that even if these forms of dissatisfaction and willingness require somewhat of an external motivator (and might be insincere at times), they at least challenge the weakness of democracy acknowledged by Tocqueville and Socrates. In light of this confrontation, the three general principles explained by Tocqueville might actually permit that North-Americans become interested in wellness so that they can adopt the values of original Socratism.
It's no wonder then that Tocqueville held some admiration for North-America - we get to feel reassured that not only is it possible for an app to improve our mental health, but that it also has the ability to heal our souls, and for only 7.99 a month!
Thus ideally, those who are inspired by their favourite Instagram influencers to download a mindfulness app will eventually develop a level of self-awareness that consequently inspires them to download some philosophy e-books on their mom's kindle - and hopefully eventually be reminded of their ineluctable mortal state of being.
To reconsider the phrase to "live as if you are dying" and remember that you are in fact dying - and that it is not as morbid as it sounds - is this not the ultimate North-American dream?
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